University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

Faculty Publications

2000

Development and Status of Insurance Bad Faith in Montana
Greg Munro
University of Montana School of Law, greg.munro@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Munro, Greg, "Development and Status of Insurance Bad Faith in Montana" (2000). Faculty Journal
Articles & Other Writings. 25.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

INsun¡.NCE CoNsuMER CouNspr-ts Cor-uMN
Dnvnr,OpMENT eNo SterUS OF INsun¡.NCB Bnl Ferrrl rN MoNteNn
nv Pponns s ox Cnac Mtmtr.o
Since most

of our torts had

their inception hundreds of years
ago in England, the cause of action
known as bad faith is a flev/ development. Nevertheless, in its short
history in Montana, it has already
been the subject of an intense tug of
war between those who view it as a

Insurance bad faith and its attendant threat of punitive
damages are the most viable and effective tools
plaintiffls counsel has at his or her disposal for
enforcing duties and promises of insurance companies,

and those who
view it as an intolerable pox on

In

Montana,

the courts originally created insurance bad faith tort and, when necessary, based it on violations of the
state insurance code. Ironically, the
Iegislature's attempts to restrict insuraflce bad faith in the name of tort
"refoffn" have resulted in codification of a good deal of common law
followed by expansive couft interpretations of the statute. F{ence, the
tort is very much alive and evolving
in 2000. Within the limits of these
pages, I will outline the development of the tort of bad faith as it
applies to insurance in Montana
ending with particular attention to
the issue of the existence now of
bad faith tort outside the Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices ,\ctt. ,\t
the outset, I want to thank Pat
Sheehy md Gary Zzdick fot theit
invaluable review and cornment on
this work.
Early History of the Tort
1,964, Federal Judge Jami-

Montana and other states on the
duty of the insurer in considering
settlement offers. Jamison held that
"the insurer must give the interests
of its insured equal consideration
with its own interests and must in all
respect-s deal faidy with the insured."' He set forth the factors the
insurer must consider in determining
whether to settle for the benefit of
its insured:

(1) whether, by reason of
the severity of the plaintiffs
injuries, any verdict is likely
to be greatly in excess of the

policy limits; (2) whether
the facts in the case indicate
that a defendant's verdict on

the issue of liability

is

doubtful; (3) whether the
compariy has given due reto the recommendations of its trial counsel; (4)

gard

whether the insured has
been informed of all settJement demands and offers;
(5) whether the insured has
demanded that the insurer
settle within the policy limits; (6) whether the company
has given due consideration
to any offer of contribution
made by the insured.a

u.

Fanners

Union Properry dz

Casaaltjt

Co.,'

Fou/er u. State Farn

Mut. Aato.

Ins.

C0.,6 and, Thornpsoru u. Stale Farm

Mut. Auto.

corporâte profits. Insurance bad
fatth and its attendant threat of
punitive damages ate the most viable and effective tools plaintiffs
counsel has at his or her disposal for
enforcing duties and promises of
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sonable settlement offer on a clatrn
against the insured. The often-cited
case received national attention and,
to this day, is the seminal word in

National

corporations

In

lessen u. ODanief which recognized an insuret's liability to its own
insured for failure to accept a. rca-

of

Insofar as it placed on an insurer a liability over and above its
contractually promised limit of coverage,Jesseru was the first "bad faith"
case in Montana. It was a "fustpatty" "excess-covetage" case. J essen
was followed by similar fìrst-party
excess-coverage cases including Ferter Liue¡tock Co.

necessary tool
for balancing
the disparity of
power between
consumers and

insurance companies.

son delivered the landmark opinion

Co.1 , which applied

Ins.

rhe luseru factors

while mixing concepts of bad faith
and negligence. F{owever, in each
case the courts found that the insurer's conduct was not actionable.
In the Jessen era, the courts
contributed a couple of contract decisions important to the history of
bad faith law and punitive damages
in Montana. First, in ll/ufall u. Motors In¡. Corp.,8 the Montana Supreme
Court held that one could not obta:n
punitive damages for a breach of
contract even though the breach was

willfrrl or fraudulent. However, in
State ex rv/. Larson u. Districl Court of
the Etþth Judicial Dist.,e the court, for
insurance contracts, made an excep-

tion to the lYestfall rule. The l-¿r¡on
court noted that MCA 527-1-202
provides "[e]very person who suffers detriment ftom the unlawful act
or omission of another may recover
from the person in fault a compensation therefore in money, which is
called damages."to Recogn izng thzt
a brezch of an insurance contract
could also be a violation of the
Montana Insurance Code such that
it would be an unlawfr¡l act under
527-I-202, the court held the situation distinguishable fuom Il/esfall, so

that punitive damages would

be
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zvail,able.I-¿r¡on was viewed as judicial creation ofa new bad faith cause
of action based in statute.ll an
insurer's breach of contract was also

If

a violation of the Montana Insurance Code, then the defendant insurer was potentially liable under the

"unlawful act or omission" provision of 527-1,-202. Plaintiffs' anorneys would refer to this form of bad

faith as "tortious breach of the insurance code."

One should note here that, in
1959, Montana
adopted an insurance code for
the protection of

1ts

the insurance contract and indepenof statute."16 In l-ipinski, the
court recognized the prima facie tot
of insurance bad faith which would
support a punitìve damages clarm.

dent

Advent of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act
Until 1977, the Montana In-

(4) refuse to p^y claims
without conductìng a. teasonable investigation based
upon all available informa-

tion;

(5) fail to affirm or deny
coverage of claims within a
reasonable time after proof
of loss statemènts have

surarìce Code, contained no comprehensive statement of insurer's duties.
1977, the Monta:ra Legislature

been completed;

added

prompt, fafu, zrrd equitable

In

to the Code a set of

L4

(ó) neglect to attempt in

good fatth to

setflements

The court's holding virtually eliminated the actual
damage requirement and made a claim possible where
the insurer's handling of the claim was offensive even
though it ultimately did not owe the benefit it denied.

cltlzens.

The 1959 code
lacked any com-

effectuate

of

claims in
which liability
has

become

reasonably
cleag
@ compel in-

prehensive

sureds

statement of du-

stitute litiga-

ties an insurer owed its insured or
third-parry claimants. It did contain
provisions, which, if violated, might
provide a cause of action and punitive damages under

l-^ar¡0ru.

In 1982, the

Montana

Supreme Cout decided tn Weber u.
Blue Cror of Montana,l3 that health
service corporations like Blue Cross
are not subject to the insurance code
(and hence, tortious breach of the
code), but are nevertheless subject
to a duty of good faith and potentially liable for breach of that duty.

The court reasoned that the health
seryices corporation's superior bargainrng position in relation to its
insured, the insureds' lack of voice
in negotiating the contracts and the
corporation's potential for oppressive tactics in handling claims all
made it appropriate that it be subiect
to a good faith duty.'"
I^ipinski u. Title lrts. Co,'u made
it clear that there existed a cofiunort
law tort of bad fai¡h ¡hat applied to

insurance companies. The court
said, "[s]hould there be any doubt,
we now expressly hold that insutance companies have a dutY to act in
good faith with their insureds, and
that this duty exists independent of

Tnrer,TnnNDS - SUMMEn 2000

"snfah claims settlement practices"
which were forbidden by "any person" acting "with such frequency as
to in4_icate a general business practice."'' These were codihed as MCA
S33-18-201 and have not been
amended since their adoption. Their
key prohibitions form the backbone
of the present bad faith insurance
remedies in Montana:

33-18-201 Unfair claim
settlement practices prohibited. No person may,
with such frequency as to
indicate a general business
practice, do any of the fol-

to

ur-

tion to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy
by offering substantially less
than the arnounts ultimately

recovered in

actions

brought by such insureds;
(8) attempt to settle z claim
fot less than the amount to

which a teasonzble

m'¿n

would have believed he was
entitled by reference to writ-

ten or printed advertising
materizl accompanying or
made part of an application;
(9) attempt to settle claims
on the basis of an applica-

lowing:

tion that was altered without notice to or knowledge

(1) misrepresent pertinent
facts or insurance policy

or consent of the insured;
(10) make claims payments

provisions relating to cover-

to insureds or beneficiaries
not accompanied by state-

ages at issue;

Q) fall to acknowledge and
reasonably promptly
upon coû)rnunications with
respect to claims arising un-

act

der insurance policies;
(3) fail to adopt and implement reasonable standards
for the prompt investigation

of claims arising under
surance policies;

in-

ments setting forth the coverage under which the payments are berng made;
(11) make known to rnsureds or claimants a policy

of

appealing from arbitntion awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the
purpose of compelhng them
to accept settlements or

PncB 37

it

out of a breach of
defaulting party, by

cornpromises less than the
amount awarded n aù:lilrz-

though

tion;
(L2) delay the investigatron
or payment of claims by
requiring afl insuted,
claimant, or physician of either to submit a preliminary

breaching the cont(act, also bteaches

contract,

arises

if a

a duty which he owes to the other
party iridependently of the contract."te Though the court in Goddard
expressly found the insurer's conduct to be a breach of the insurance
code, it quoted the Caiifornia case of
Fletcher u. IY/estern National Life Ins.
Co.,'o say'rrg "An insurer owes its
insured an implied-inlaw duty of
good faith and fah dealing that it
will do nothing to deprive the n
sured of the benefits oFthe policy."21
Of prime importance in the case was
the court's holding that it was unnecessary to prove actual malice for
punitive damages allowing a standard of implied malice to invoke the
darnage." This was deemed alarming to those who felt the eviàence in
Coddard only showed error and no
malice on the part of the insurer."
Harri¡ u. American Cen. IJfe Ins.
Co.,'o allowed a first-party benef,lt
clakn for punitive damages for bad
faith even though the jury ultimately

claim repott and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of
loss forms, both of which
submissions contain substantially the same information;
(13) fail to promptly setde
claims, if liability has become reasorìably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in
order to influence settlements under other portions
of the insurance policy covera$e:,of

(a) fztl to promptly provide a reasonable explarntion of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to
the facts or applicable law
for denial of a clakn or for
the offer of a compromise
settlement.

fleature

holding that the third-paty action
against the insurer for bad faith
"may be filed and tried before, concurrent with, or after liability has
been determined."2e Even Chief Justice Morrison, rccognized for his
consumer zdvocacy, warned aganst.
that holding. Joining of the underlying action with the bad faith tort was
viewed as creating insurmountable
conflict for the insrrrer.'o
Not sulprisingly, after three
years of experimentation linkrng the
underlying action with the bad faith
action, the court overturned that as-

damzge

The statute, which constituted
a faiùy comprehensive statement of
prohibited practices of the insurers
in handling claims, would provide
the basis for pleading causes of action for tortious breach of the insur-

requirement and made a claim possi-

ance code.

Development of Third-Party
Bad Faith

ln

maft u. Goddørd,l8 the court recognized that breach of an insurance

contract could "sound

in tot

al-

oî

found no benefit due the claimant so

that the punitive damage claim was
not supported by any cornpensatory
damages. The court's holding virtu-

ally eliminated the actual.

Fir¡t Secariry Bank of Bory

u. Superior Court of Bøn Coantljs
when it overtumed a long line of
precedent by holding thar a thirdparty claimant could sue an insurance company for violating the California "Unfzir Trade Practices ,\ct
(UTPA)".26 The California UTpA
was virtually identical to Monta¡a's
which made it predictable that Montana would follow suit as it did in
Klaudt u. Flink.z1 The Montana
Supreme Court held that a thirdpaty clalrnant in Montana could
have a direct private civil right of
action against an insurer for breach
of $33-18-201, of the UTPA. The
court said the UTP,A. was meant for
the benefit of third-party claimants
as well as first-party insureds, ar-rd
held that the statute's preLmrnarl
requirement that the insurer's conduct be shown to occur "with such
frequency as to indicate a general
business practice" could be proven
by evidence of multiple violations of
the co^{e during handling of a single
clairn."
FIowever, the most striking

ble where the insurer's handling

of

the claim was offensive evefl though

it ultimately did not owe the benefit
it denied.

In 1979, the

Cùifonia

Supreme Court delivered the blockbuster decision of Royl Globe In¡. Co.

the Klaudt decision was its

MnnrcYoun CnILNDAKsI
þon't

míss the

Anr'""1 fonventíon!

J"ly Z7-28, Zooo - Y ol"on, ffiontana
Pncn 38
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oect of Rlaudt in the case of Fode u.
'For*rrc
court

Ins. Exch.u'There, the
held that bad faith ptoceedings all"grg the insurer's violation of the
insurance code must be suspended
until the undedying claims have
been determined by settlement or
judgment. The court admitted that
Klaadt's procedure of allowing the
actrons to be joined was a mistake
that placed insurers in conflict and
causing them

though the express terms of
the policy do not impose the

duty. In

determining

whether to settle, the insurer
must give the insured's in-

terest as much consideratlon3as it gives its own interest.

UT?Á, and to create protections for
the insurers. The resulting bill, was
codifred as follows:

33-18-242. Independent
cause of action-burden of
proof.
(1)

A" insured or a third-party

claimant has an independent
T]rte Cibson case was based
entirely on iudicially created princi-

of action against an insurer for act:.tal damages

cause

caused by the
insurer's viola-

prejudice.

tion of subsecGood Faith
and Fair Dealing by the

Fiduciary

factors

(4),

(s), (6), (e), or
(13) of 33-18201,.

In L984,
the court revisited Jusen when it decided the case
of Gibnn u. IYestern Firv lrus. C0'" L
first-parfy excess-coverage case.
While the court applied the original
Jesseru

tion (1),

The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case, although
the express terms of the policy do not impose the duty.

in

upholding

the

excess-coverage verdict against the
insurer, its decision reflected the
intervening evolution in law insofar
as the court treated the failure to
settle as a brezch of an implied
obligation of good fz.:rrh and fair
dealing by a fiduciary bound by a
duty of highest good faith. The

court said:
The duty to accept a reasonable offerwithin policy coverage limits arises from an
implied covenarit of good
futh and fair dealing that

neither party will do anything which will injure the
right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement. One of the usual benefits of a liabtity insurance
policy is the setdement of
claims without litigation, or
at least without trial if the
cause is litigated. The implied obligation of good
fai¡h ard fair dealing requires the insurer to settle

rn an appropÅate case, aL-
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Q)Inm

ples of bad faith and not on the
UT?A (533-18-201). The court in
Gibson said that an insurer which
'"intentionally conceals material facts
within its knowledge and not known

by its insured rrray be found in bad
faith" so long as the facts concealed
are material to the sub¡ect of the
trust or duty of the fìduciary.uo The
court reasoned that the fiduciary is
bound to the highest good faith in
the subject of its trust. Note that the
UT?A does not treat the insurer's
concealing of materiai facts from the
insured as a basis for tortious bad
faith. Hence, Cibson presents an example of conduct that is bad faith at

common law but not under the
statutes.

Legislative Restriction of
Bad Faith
The 1987 Montana Legislature was probably the most significant in the state's history in terms of
"tort reform." Fear of the tort of bad
faith and punitive damages was an
obsession with insurance companies
and their allied banks. That year, the
insurance lobby secured legislatìve
restriction of insurance baí |rrithot
and punitrve damages'u. The ntent
was to limit the bad faith remedy to
certain conduct prohibited by the

action

under this section, a plaintiff is not required

to prove that the violations
were

of such frequency as to
a genenl business

indicate
practice.

(3)

'\tr

insured who has suf-

fered damages as a result of
the handling of an insurance

claim may bring an action
against the insurer for breach

of the insurance contract, for
fraud, or pursuaflt to this section, but not under any other
theory or cause of action.
'{n
insured may not bring an action for bad faith in connection with the handling of an
insurance claim.

(a)

In an action

under this

section, the court or jury may
award such damages as were

proximately caused by the violation of subsection (1), (4),
(5), (ó), (9), or (13) of 33-1820L. Exemplary damages may

also be assessed in accordance with 27-1-221..
(5) A" insurer may not be
held liable under this

sect-ion

if the insurer had a reasonable
basis in law or in fact for
contesting the claim or the

amount of the

claim,

whichever is in issue.

Plcn 39

(6) (a) An insured may file an
action under this section, to-

That subsection declares it to be an
unfair claims practice to:

action the insured has
against the insurer. Äctions
may be bifurcated for trial
where justice so requires.

(b)

A

third-party claimant
may not file an action under
this section until after the underlying claim has been set-

2.

Six categories

of

con-

duct of insurers which entrrle the third-party claimant
to the action;
3. Relief from the burden
of proving that the conduct

gethet with any other cause

of

contract;

compel insureds to institute
recover

litigation to

âmounts due under an insurance policy by offering
substantially less than the

occurs with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice;

amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by

4.

such insureds;

Punitive damages for

tled or
judgment^

bad faith; and

entered in fa-

of the cause

vor of

the
claimant on
the underlying claim.

fl)

The

riod

Legislative "reform" of punitive damages was also
key to restricting bad faith, since punitive damages
are an essential part of the remedy of insurance
company abuse of consumers and claimants.

pe-

pre-

scribed for commencemerìt
of an action under this section is:
@) for an insured, within 2
years from the date of the
violation of 33-lB-201.; md
þ) for a third-party claimant,
within 1 year from the date of
the settlement of or the enttY
of judgment on the undedy-

That practice may be the most
frequent form of claims setdement
abuse by insurers and can cause the
innocent third party to incur unrecovetable actual damages in the
form of attomey fees to obtain that
which should have been theirs in the
first place.

ing claim.

Nevertheless, the statute also
codiÍred a" private nght of action fot

(B) As used in this section, an

third-paty bad faith claims for

insurer includes a person,
frrm, or coqporation uttlizng
self-insurance to pay claims

breach

made against them.

Globe case, which originally created
the right, was later overtumed by

This statutorT restrictlon v/as
viewed as draconian and bittedy resisted by the Montana Ttial Lawyers
Association. It pulports to limit bad
faith actions to certain specified
conduct in the handling of claims. It
provides the insuret an affrmztive
defense if it "l'rad a reasonable basis
in law or ln fact for contesting" a
claim. It purports to limit both firstparty and third-party claims, and it
shortens statutes of limltations in
fzvor of the insurers. Perhaps the
most insidious zspect of the statute
is its failure to include subsection @
of the U¡fair Claims Settlement
Practices Act,33-L8-201 as a basis
for the independent cause of action.
Pecn 40

of the UTPA. This was a

sþificant outcome in light of the
fact that Califomia's landmark Royl
Moradi-Shalal u. Firvman'¡ Fand Ins.
ComparuiefT

in a trend that

ended

private rights of action for violation
of UTPA-type statutes in other
states. In the wake of Moradi-Shalal,
one of the principle insurance schol-

5.Extension
of
action to selfinsurers.

The ttReformt'of
Punitive
Damages
Iægislatrve "reform" of puni-

trve damages was also key to restricting bad faith, since punitive damages
are an essenttd, partof the remedy of
insurance company abuse of consuners and claimants. Amrd fierce

lobbyng, the legislature statutorily
pulported to block punitive damages
-breach
ior
of conúãct3e ($21 -r-220);
required actual as opposed to implied malice as a standard for punitive damages ($27-I-221); required a
separate hearing on the amount of
punitive damages; stepped-up the
burden of proving punitive damages
to "clear and convincing' widence;
and enacted other procedural hurdles. The only bright spot was that
the legislature adopted the standard

for

acr..ral

malice from

Owerus a.

Parker Dritling Ca.,ao which is mote
consurner friendly than the old statu-

ars

tory standard of "malicious, fraudulent or oppressive."

development whose

The Suwival of Common Law
Bad Faith
Enacünent of $33-IB-242, rc-

in the United States wrote,
"Although there are stjll remnants of
the private cause of action in a few
other states, it now appears to be a
time

has

passed."" The fact is the 1987 Mon-

tanz legislation granted statutory
recognition to the following:

1.

Existence of a cause of
action for bad faith independent of the insurance

stricting the bad faith cause of action
under the UTPA, left questions
about the surviving state of cornmon
law bad faith tort as applied to insurance. Plaintiffs' counsel wondered
whether any form of common law

insurance bad faith surwived the

Tnr¡rTnnNDS - SuMMEn 2000

1987 legislanrre? Was there such a

thing as bad faith conduct outside
the handling of the claims? The
picture looked grim, and 533-1,8-242

was not the only blow the tort of
bad faith, as applied to insurance,
would suffer. In l-990, in the case of
Storl u. C;U of Boqeman,ot the Montana Supreme Court placed a severe
restriction on claims for bad faith
breach of contract which necessarily
applied to insur-

contract must be a noflprofit motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind, secutity, futute protection; fand]
(3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate be-

sounds in tort.

In

O'Fa/lon u. Farmers Iru¡.
the court held that an insuted could bnng a cornmon law
action if the Unfair Trade Settlement
Practices Äct did not apply. There
the court said that a third-party
claimant could bring an action
against a claims adjuster as well as
an insurer under
533-18-201 a¡d

the party in the superior po-

sition to account for its ac-

tions, and þ) th"y do not
make the inferior pzfty

milI

s33-1,8-242. The

There the court said that a tlíird-party claimant could
bring an action against a claims adiuster as well
âs an insurer under 533-18-201 and $33-18-242.

the City of
Bozeman. The pertinent cause of
action was the contractor's appendant claim for bad faith tort based

on implied malice in the

city's
breach of the construction contract.
The court held that there was no

of action for bad faith in the
breach of a contact, even if intentional or malicious. The court reversed the development of the tort
of bad fairh as applied to contract
cause

breaches when it reasoned that every

contract involves a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing so that
breach of that covenarit merely gives
rise to a clz:tm for breach of contract
and not a claim in ton.

llowever, the court recognized an exception to its prohibition
against bad Faith tort in contract
claims for those situations involving

"special circumstances," in which a
special telationship existed between

the contracting partres that would
allow for z clair¡' of bad faith tort.
The court specified five factors for
identifying such a special relationship:

(1) the contract must

be

such that the parties are in
urherently unequal baryan-

ing positions; [and] (2) the
motivation for entering the

Tnrer, TnnNDs - SUMMEn 2000

"whole"; fand] (+) one party

is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it
may suffer and of necessity
places trust in the other
party to perform; and (5) the

other parry is aware of this
vulnerability.a2

The immediate question

was

whether the relationship between iflsured and insurer was a "special
relationship." In StEltew u. Safeco lns.
Co. of Anerica," the court applied the
Flve Story factors to the contract be-

tween ari insured and insurer and

found

it

was. Stephens predated the

UTP,\'s restrictions on bad faith
claims, though it was decided after
enactment of the UTPA. Nevertheless, it is important that, in Stelshen:,
the court recognized the existence of
cofirnon law bad faith tort outside
the context of the Unfair Trade Settlement Practices Act:

[]nsurance companies have
a duty to act in good faith
with their insureds, and this
duty exists independent of
the insurance contract and
rndependent of statute. If
this duty is breached the
cause of action of the in-

44

Exclt.,os

cause (a) they do not require

ance policies because they are

corfiracts. StorJl
involved a construction contract between a
contractor and

suted against the insurer

cout

said KkadtI

zuthorizztton of z
direct action
against a "persofl"

under $33-18-201
was not in conflict
with $33-1 8 -242, which provides for
the statutory cause of action agunst
insurers but did not "othetwise limlt
previously cteated coffunorì law
causes of zciton." llowever, z
clarmant ptessing an action against
an adjuster under $33-18-201 must
prove that the conduct occurs "with
such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" under that
statute, while an action agatnst an
insurer under $33-18-242 is relieved
of that burden of proof.

The Recent Life of Bad Faith in
Insurance
In 1998, the coutt identified a
whole arca of ìnsurer conduct not
govemed by the UTPA and hence
not subject to the bad faith resffictions of 533-18-242. In Thomat u.
Northwutern National Iru¡arance Compool,ou the Thomases sued their in-

surer, Northwestern National, for
neglþnce, bad faith, and breach of
fiduciary duty after the carrier refused to defend them on a pollution
claim arising frcman oil spill caused
by their plumbing business. The
Thomases contended that Northwestem had a duty to wam them,
upon annual renewal of their commercial general insurance policy, that

the company had inserted a more
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restrictive "Total Pollution Exclusion" resulting in a lack of coverage
for the spill. It followed that the
Thomases claimed the insurer
breached its fiduciary obligation and
acted in bad faith in not waming
them of the detrimental change in
the policy. The case is signifrcant in
two areas: First, collateral to the bad
faith issues, the court found that
Northwestern did have a duty to

warn of

lished that insurers have the bur-

insureds.

Second, Northwestern successfi.rlly persuaded the lower court

that Montana's UTPA' specifically
533-'1,8-242(3) precluded the
Thomases' corrrnon law claims for
neglþnce, bad faith, and breach of
fiduciary duty. However, the Montana Supreme Court disagreed that

out of the
"handling of an insurance claim" so
as to bring them within the restrictions of the statute. The court noted
that the obvious intent of the UTPÁ.
was to protect insureds from unfair
ffeatrnent by insurers in the handling
of claims. The Thomases' claims
focused on Northwestern's conduct
during the renewal of the policy
prior to the handling of the claims.
The court found that the legislature did not intend the UTPA to
be the exclusive remedy for insureds
bringrng litigaúon against their insurers and noted the language of
these were claims arising

533-18-242(6)(a) that "an insured
may íJ-Je an action under this section,
with an1 olher caurc of actiorc the

insured has again:t

tlte

claim since this w¿s

z

ifliurcr."
However,
emphasis]
[author's
Northwestern also contended that
Story blocked any collateral tort

42

clzim for

in favor

The court also made the logrcal holding that an insurer which, rn

a

a cleadiability excess-damages case,

"special relationship" which could
support a bad faìú action. Furthermore, the court concluded that the
Thomases' claims of bad faith and
breach of fiduciary duty survived

pays minimum limits without obtainrng a fi¡ll and fìnal release, is not
þer rcacingin bad faith.

Guaranty National had taken

the position that, under

The court recently expanded rights of third-party insureds
under the UTPA in resolving the conflict that occurs when
the claimant cannot sign a full and final release and the
insurer refuses to tender minimum limits without such signing

den of proving
that they provided adequate
notice of policy changes to their

P¡et

insurer, Northwestern, was

lease of all liability
of an insured.

the

more restrictive
pollution exclusion and estab-

rogether

breach of the contractual insurance
policy promises. The court applied
the fìve element analysis of Story and
confirmed that the relationship between the insureds, Thomases, and

equitable
ments

of

and statute.

48

settle-

claims"

[author's emphasis] and that, under

Jaedenan
533-IB-242, because the common
law, in that situation, was not in
conflict with $33-18-242. T\e court
reiterated what it said in OFallon:
Insurers hzve z duty to act in good
faiùt, and that duty still exists independent of the insurance contract

$33-18-

201(6), ít had a
duty "to effectu¿te
prompt, fah a¡d

tioza/

a. Na
Farmers

Unioru,'" without an agreement for
release, there could be no settlement.
Guannty claimed it conditioned its
tender of minimum limits on sþing
of the release, because it feared a

if it
did not. The court noted that the
policy provided no promise by the

bad faith action by its insured

The court recently expanded

insurer that it would obtain a release

rights

of third-party ìnsureds under
the UTPA in resolving the conflict

and that a minimum limits insured
could have no such expectation in

that occurs when the clzrnant cannot sþ a fuIl and final release and
the insurer refuses to tender minimum limits without such signing. In

the circumstances. Most importantly,
the court said it would not second

[Yatters u. Guaranþt National Ins. Co.,a1

the court said:

guess the legislature's provision in
UTPA 533-18-242Q) that "An in-

sured may not bring an zclton for
bad faith in connection with the
handling of an insurance claim."

hold that where an

Consequently, the court held that the

insured's liability for damages caused to a third paty

insurer may no longer impose the
full and final release as a condition
to settlement in minimum limits

ffie

in an auto accident is reasonably clear, and those
damages undisputedly ex-

ceed the mandatory limits

set forth under $61-6-L03,
MCA, it is an unfair trade
przcttce per se under $33-18201, MCA, for an insurer to

condition the payment of
the owed mandatory minimum policy limits on the
third party's agreement to
provide a full and find, rc-

cases.

This has two imports: First, it
will be easier to convince carriers to

prompdy pay mrnimum limits to
third-party claimants. Second, as
pointed out by Gary Zadick, who
even before this case counseled car-

riers to pay such hmits without demanding a release, claimant's counsel will lose the "setup" for bad faith
which occurs when carriers condition payment of minimum lrnits in

Tnr¡rTnnruDs - SuMMEn 2000

clearJiability bad-damages cases on

sþitrg of full and

ftnøJ releases.

"Setup" aside, the holding is a good
sound step in effectuating prompt
and fe¡lr settlements.

The biggest recent news from
the bad faith front is the coutt's
holding n Brewington u. Enpklers Firv
Iw. Co.,oo that the UTPA does not

preempt corrunon law claims for
third-party bad faith. On appeal to
the Montana Supteme Court, Brewington won a workers'
compensation decision
granting him perma-

rient total

third-par4t clairnant an independent
cause of action against an insurer for
breach of the UTPA. llowever, the
court pointed out that subsection (3)
limiting actions against the insurer to

of

contract, fraud,

doesn't seek bad faith damages for
violation of the UTP,\.

Conclusion
fnsurance bad faith tort is
alive in Montana. We are in the
unusual situation of having codified
the private right of action for thirdunder the UTPA while

or

claimants against insuters may ptovoke a legislative response. That is a
good reminder that the law of insurance bad faith is made in paft by
those legislators who win their campabns.
Brvwingtoru aside, counsel
should note the potential statute of

limitations pitfall in 533-1,-242Q).
The limitation under subsection ff
for third-party claimants is one year
from the date the undedying claim is

brought to conclusion, but the
statute for first-parry claims is two
years from the alleged occurrence of
the bad faith. Hence, counsel litigating a firsrparty claim like UIM may
forget the running of the statute
thinking it is preserved until resolu-

tion of the undedying claim. As Pat
Sheehy sâys, "It's a short porch."
Finally, the court has just held

the

t'

forbidding "any other theory or
cause of zctfon" applied only to afl

Dist. Court,so that a declaratory judgment action brought to enforce advance payment of medical expense
pursuarit to Nd/q u. Guaranry Nat'l
lns. C0.,"' is not barred by the UTPA,

That subsection did not menthird-þarfl claimarcts. Conse-

iru¡arvd.

quentl¡ the court held that 533-18242 does not preclude a third-party
clzimart from bringing an action for
conunon law bad faith.
On the basis of that holding

the court then found that

the

UTPA's statute of limitations of one

SUMMEn 2000

that right has disappeared or never existed in most other

states. The third-

pafty common law
action for bad faith

n

TrunrTnnxDs -

or clarify rights under any coverage
before the undedying claim is settled
or adjudicated so long as the action

paty claimants

specified conduct of the UTPA and

tion

use declaratory judgment to enforce

The tort of insurance bad faith and the attendant
potential for punitive damages are potent weapons
in the fight to make insurance companies honor
their promises and duties to claimants and insureds.

disability
benefits and ordering
Employers Fire Insurance and Commercial
Union to pay his benefits and attomey fees. BrewinSon
later sued defendants for breach of
the duty of good fai¡h arÅ fm dealing claiming that they refused to pay
the attomey fees as ordered and
engaged in a course of continuous
tortious conduct. The district court
dismissed Brewington's complaint
on the ground that the statute of
limitations governing third-party
claims under the UTPA barred the
bad faith claims brought by his personal representative. Ffowever, the
Supreme Court found the UTP,\ did
not apply. The court noted that subsectron (1) granted an insurvd or a

bteach

year from settlement or entry of
judgment did not apply. Instead, the
court held that the statute for thirdparty common law bad faith claims
is the three years provided under
527-2-204. Justice Gtay concurred
that subsection (3) of $33-78-242
did not âpply to third-party
claimants but appeared to do so
unhappily and all but told the legislature to amend. Flence, this decision
which is music to those reptesenting

Safem [ns. Co. u. Mortana

533-18-242(6)(b)

¡adicial

and my

be

brought before the undedying claim

of by settlement
or judgment. lUhile this decision is
premised on Medical Pay coverage,
it means that plaintiffls counsel can
has been disposed

has been affirmed 'rn Bruwington, as
has the cofirnon law action for firstparry bad faith for insurer misconduct prior to handling of the claim.
First-paty claims for conduct during
handling of the claim are codifred
with a comprehensive set of prohibited insurer conduct, allowance of
punitive damages and relief from the

of
the insurer's conduct as to be a

burden ofproving such frequency

general business practice. First and
third-party claimants ma¡ during the
underlying litigation, in spite of any

prohibition

of the UTPA, seek

declaratory judgments to enforce
coverage rights. The recent Thomaq
Brewington,

atd

lYatter¡ decisions in-

dicate that the Montana Supreme
Court will carefirlly scrutjnize the
UTPA and expansively interpret it to
allow insurance consumers and
third-party claimants the remedies
necessary to pfomote pfompt, fair,
and equitable settlements.
The tort of insurance bad faith
and the attendânt potential for punitive damages are potent weapons in
the fight to make insurance companies honor their promises and duties

to

claimants and insureds. Consequendy, one can expect that bad
faith tort will always be under ztrack,
so vigilance by plaintiffs' counsel in

Pecn 43

court and on the campaign trail will
be necessary to keep the weapon
rhæp.
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